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Introduction 
Medicine cures the sickness of the human body, but what is 
appropriate to remedy the maladies and pains of the human soul? 
Martha Nussbaum, in her book, The Therapy of Desire, responds 
to this question by arguing that philosophy has the ability to re-
store health to the human soul. What's more, Nussbaum also ar-
gues that various Hellenistic schools formulated "medical moral 
philosophies" which had precisely this therapeutic objective. She 
asserts that examples of medical moral philosophies would include 
the systems of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics, but Nussbaum 
precludes the addition of what she calls the "Augustinian Chris-
tian ethic" from the list of medical moral philosophies. Nussbaum 
claims that the Augustinian Christian ethic cannot be considered 
medical because it fails to arise from human needs, desires, and 
aspirations. This paper will undertake to explain why this position 
should be rethought. 
In this paper, I will explain why the Augustinian Christian 
ethic can indeed be considered a medical moral philosophy con-
cerned with producing happiness and a healthy soul. This paper 
will maintain that the Augustinian Christian ethic satisfies all the 
common characteristics associated with any medical moral phi-
losophy. Furthermore, this paper will conclude that Nussbaum's 
primary problem is one of "human good", since as Nussbaum as-
serts, the Augustinian ethic fails to place the locus of the human 
good squarely within human being itself. Consequently, she ar-
gues, God's will and grace must be considered the locus of the 
human good. This conclusion should be reconsidered, and this 
paper will show, by way of examining the Augustinian ontology, 
along with the role of grace in the Augustinian world view, that 
indeed human being and human experience are the centers out of 
which human well-being and happiness flows. And so, in the final 
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analysis, this paper will demonstrate how Nussbaum's primary 
problem with the Augustinian ethic is without merit. 
In order to support these claims, I will examine Nussbaum's 
general position regarding eudaemonia and its relationship to medi-
cal moral philosophies. Furthermore, I will also examine the on-
tological underpinnings of Augustine's ethic along with other per-
tinent dimensions of the Augustinian moral system. The salient 
elements of the Augustinian ethic to be discussed will include 
Augustine's thoughts on the subjects of: eudaemonia, "Christian" 
virtue, of which "Christian" wisdom is an integral part, justice, 
and grace. By way of these discussions it should become more 
evident that this ethic is naturally inclined to being considered a 
medical moral philosophy. Furthermore, Augustine's Confessiones 
will be examined and interpreted as a case in point of an exemplum. 
And finally, after a discussion of Augustine's ontology and views 
on grace are completed, I will respond to two problematic issues. 
First I will reconcile what Nussbaum's fails to reconcile: God's 
grace within the Augustinian philosophy and a human good inde-
pendent of this very grace. Secondly, I will discuss the otherworldly 
dimension of Augustine's eudaemonistic project. 
Section I: Nussbaum's Views Concerning Medical Moral 
Philosophies and Why the Augustinian Ethic Fails to be 
Considered as a Medical Moral Philosophy 
Nussbaum claims that the thinkers of the Hellenistic period 
believed the goal of human life—eudaemonia or happiness—was 
itself that which provided for the well-being of the human soul. 
Philosophy, then, was the medication necessary to cure the diverse 
disorders and ailments of the human soul. The ethical and the 
medical were one: 
In short, there is in this period broad and deep 
agreement that the central motivation for philoso-
phizing is the urgency of human suffering, and 
the goal of philosophy is human flourishing, or 
eudaemonia.1 
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Nussbaum argues that ethics is a matter of looking into the 
lives of human beings and discerning those prescriptions that guide 
our lives towards happiness and the health of the soul. Conse-
quently, ethical truths are the "shoulds" and "oughts" which arise 
directly from the needs, wishes, and aspirations of human life.2 In 
her book, Nussbaum contrasts this view of medical ethics with 
other conceptions of ethics, including the Platonic conception, tra-
ditional social belief, and, finally, the Augustinian Christian con-
ception.3 But in this paper, I am concerned with and will briefly 
sketch out only her thoughts on the latter ethic. 
Nussbaum claims that the Augustinian Christian ethic, like the 
Platonic and traditional, does not fit the medical mold. Similar to 
the Platonic, she maintains that the Augustinian Christian ethic is 
divorced from the realm of human being and experience. 
Nussbaum writes that the Augustinian ethic is, at its heart, a 
matter of submitting one's will to the will of God. According to 
this ethic, ethical norms arise from the wants or desires of God, 
and, in order to be ethical—in order to do what one ought—one 
simply needs to conform their wants to God's wants. Simply, God 
willed what humans should do, and humans should conform their 
will to God's. Nussbaum makes comment to this point when jux-
taposing the Augustinian conception of ethics with the Platonic. 
She writes of the Augustinian ethic: 
We get a similar picture by a different route in the 
Augustinian version of Christian ethics. God has 
set up certain ethical standards; it is our job to do 
what God wants.4 
According to the Augustinian ethic, humans must have help in 
their pursuit to live ethically. Truth and God's grace provide suc-
cor in this effort, however, it is not guaranteed that we will be able 
to recognize truth or receive grace. Because of this, it is not cer-
tain that we will be able to conform our will to God's and live 
ethically. Again, Nussbaum remarks: 
But we may or may not be endowed with the ca-
pability of seeing, or wanting what God wants. 
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Truth and God's grace are out there; but the abil-
ity to see ethical truth or reach for God's grace is 
not something we can control. There is, there-
fore, no reliable method by which we can con-
struct an ethical norm from the scrutiny of our 
deepest needs and responses and desires.5 
Nussbaum concludes that human needs and aspirations cannot 
be the source of human good for two reasons. First, God's will 
provides the standard for ethical decision-making. According to 
this conception, to be ethical is a matter of wanting, too, what God 
has already decided that one ought to want. God provides the ethi-
cal norms to be followed and so can be considered the locus of the 
ethical. Secondly, we cannot derive reliable ethical norms out of 
our own human experience. We cannot use our human aspirations 
and desires to create a sound set of ethical truths to guide us to the 
authentically good life. This is so due to the human inability to 
recognize the truth and to the unpredictability of the gift of illumi-
nating grace. As Nussbaum points out, truth and God's grace ex-
ist, but there is no assurance that we can identify the one or obtain 
the other. The examination of human experience, including our 
desires, wishes, and aspirations, may turn out to yield only errone-
ous conclusions regarding ethical standards due to human igno-
rance and the privation of illuminating grace. For Nussbaum, this 
culminates in the real possibility that for Christians, "digging more 
deeply into ourselves is not the right way to proceed in ethical 
inquiry. For the possibility must always be left open that every-
thing we are and want and believe is totally in error."6 
At this point, Nussbaum contends that the good, as contained 
in God's will, is profoundly separate from human experience and, 
at the same time, is the only infallible grounds for ethical truth. As 
a result, Nussbaum argues that this ethic, at its core, entails what 
she calls this fundamental "structural idea: the idea of the radical 
independence of true good from human need and desire."7 In the 
final analysis, then, she concludes that the Augustinian Christian 
ethic cannot qualify as a medical moral philosophy because it fails 
to arise out of the human being and its experience. The basis of 
this ethic is to be found in the will of a radically independent Other. 
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Any medical moral philosophy has, as its primary objective, 
living well. But in order to achieve this objective, Nussbaum con-
cludes that a vital reconstruction of the human soul is first needed. 
This reformation demands a transformation of belief, desire, and 
emotion.8 Nussbaum points out that this necessity is stressed in 
the various medical outlooks of the Hellenistic schools, and, on 
that account, she believes that any medical ethic must include first 
recognizing and then changing these various diseased beliefs and 
desires. To the end of recognizing and sorting out problematic 
beliefs and desires, Nussbaum believes that medical moral phi-
losophies, uniquely, have developed three common "therapeutic 
tools".9 The purpose of these therapeutic tools is essentially de-
velopment and guidance. These tools guide the human being to-
wards health by means of identifying and purging various unhealthy 
convictions, appetites, and desires. Medical moral philosophies, 
then, will universally formulate "therapeutic tools" which include: 
1. A tentative diagnosis of disease, of the factors, 
especially socially taught beliefs, that are most 
prominent in preventing people from living well. 
2. A tentative norm of health: a conception (usu-
ally general and to some degree open ended) of 
the flourishing and complete human life. 
3. A conception of proper philosophical method 
and procedure.10 
Next, Nussbaum believes that all medical moral philosophies 
will have other unique features that differentiate them from other 
moral philosophies, including: 
4. Arguments have a practical goal: they are di-
rected at making the pupil better, and can be as-
sessed for their contribution to this end. 
5. They are what we might call value-relative: that 
is, at some level they respond to deep wishes or 
needs of the patient and, again, are to be assessed 
in accordance with their success in doing this. 
6. They are responsive to the particular case: just 
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as a good doctor heals case by case, so good medi-
cal arguments responds to the pupil's concrete situ-
ation and needs." 
These features, too, have specific objectives. They help to edify 
the human person and encourage development in the good. They 
also aim at making the moral philosophy relevant and responsive 
to the individual and their particular situation.. 
As alluded to earlier, a shared feature of medical moral phi-
losophies is their intention and purpose which is the transforma-
tion of belief, desire, and passion. The objective of any medical 
moral philosophy is the improvement of people, not merely ethi-
cally or morally, but also physically and spiritually. A necessary 
means to achieving this end, Nussbaum points out, includes the 
use of what she calls an "exemplum". For Nussbaum, the exemplum 
is an essential device for the amelioration of people's lives since 
it has the distinctive ability to intimately relate to the lives of its 
readers. Exempla are devices, unique to medical moral philoso-
phies, which express the moral thoughts of a system. But they do 
much more than pass along intellectual ideas and arguments con-
sidering the fact that they cover the ideas and arguments within a 
highly personal, highly intimate surfacing, thus making the thoughts 
more applicable to the concrete lives of people. Exempla instruct 
in right behavior, but they also paint a picture for the reader ex-
pressing more about right action and the well-lived life than can 
be communicated by intellectual ideas and arguments alone. The 
exemplum is an important tool since it is able to invaluably pro-
mote teaching, connection, relevance, and reflection. Nussbaum 
writes: 
The importance of exempla and narrative in Stoic 
teaching is, then, closely connected to the impor-
tance Stoics attach to concreteness. And this it-
self seems to have more than one source. One as 
we have seen is motivational: we cannot really 
change a personal soul without engaging it in a 
highly personal, vivid, and concrete way. 1 2 
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Section II: The Augustinian Ethic and its Ontological 
Underpinnings 
The Augustinian moral theory is intimately connected with 
the Augustinian ontology. The human good, for Augustine, is not 
disconnected from both the individual's being and the greater en-
vironment within which the human person exists. Goodness is 
part of both persons and their world. Hence, ontology is important 
for Augustine and constitutes the starting point for any reasonable 
introduction to Augustine's moral theory. Moreover, understand-
ing Augustine's ontology constitutes the first step in refuting 
Nussbaum's concerns regarding medical moral philosophies and 
the Augustinian ethic. 
Vernon Bourke concludes that Augustine's ontological views 
are best formulated by responding to three distinct questions. When 
inquiring about the nature of the temporal world and created be-
ing, Augustine believes it is necessary to ask of all created being: 
"does it exist, what is it, and does it endure?"13 Bourke claims that 
Augustine's analysis of created being constitutes a response to these 
specific questions. 
Augustine responds to the first ontological question asked, 
"does it exist?" with the reply that temporal being always includes 
"measure", while Augustine later interprets measure to mean "ex-
istence" or "esse."*4 In addition, esse is more precisely understood 
by Augustine to denote existence qualified as unity. For 
Augustine's ontology, then, a characteristic feature of being is 
measure or existence, understood always in terms of unity. To be, 
is to be one. To be, is to exist as a unified whole. Bourke states: 
It has been suggested by one interpreter that the 
import of the first member of the triad is existen-
tial. It is possible here that Augustine is trying to 
get at the principle of existence in each instance 
of being. If so then modus (which is sometimes 
named esse) may approximate the existential char-
acteristic of every entity. Fundamental to this in-
terpretation is the fact that the unity which Au-
gustine attributes to each being is not an abstrac-
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tion but rather the concrete fact that to be is to be 
one. 1 5 
The idea of species addresses Augustine's second ontological 
question, "what is it?" Species is the formal principle in all indi-
vidual unities which differentiate individual unities into unique 
classes or kinds. Species separates individuals into larger groups 
which themselves contain numerous individuals, all of the same 
kind. 
Finally, to the third of Augustine's ontological questions, "does 
it endure?", Bourke notes, 01 do responds. The word ordo signifies 
what we perceive simply as order. Augustine's writings assert 
that there is order and arrangement in different domains, such as 
being, space, time, or nobility, and in each of these graduated do-
mains there are hierarchies and places of greater and lesser good-
ness, value, and importance. In addition, Bourke maintains that 
the term ordo must be understood as having teleological overtones. 
Ordo, then, is a term which implies this graduated order, but it 
also implies the notion that each thing has its specific place within 
this graduated order. The teleological overtones intimate that each 
individual within this graduated whole is ordered towards a spe-
cific final end—understood in terms of value as its good. 
Bourke observes that in De Genesi ad Litteram, Augustine 
explains that a thing's weight orpondus appropriates it towards its 
good, its final place of rest and stability. Because of this, each 
individual within the ordered whole has an intrinsic tendency to-
wards its naturally designed good and place of repose and stabil-
ity. Therefore, for Augustine, within the graduated order of the 
whole of being, space, time, and nobility an individual's weight or 
pondus inclines it naturally to its divinely pre-ordained terminus, 
and as a result, this natural terminus is the good which the indi-
vidual has been designed to incline itself towards. To abide in 
being then, for Augustine, is not merely to persist or persevere in 
existence, but it is sometimes to accept and always conform to a 
thing's rightful place in that pre-determined order within which an 
individual thing finds itself. To abide includes a thing's living 
within its pondus, realizing and participating in its proper, pre-
determined end and good. To sum up, in Bourke's words, for a 
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thing to endure or abide in being is, "not merely to last but to 
achieve that ideal perfection in the whole of things which is the 
divine plan of Providence."16 
This discussion of Augustine's ontology brings to light this 
idea: beings exist always as individual unities which are part of a 
class of like individuals, and which subsist within an order that has 
been pre-arranged within a gradated whole. Hence, within the 
nature of the world, both beings and their respective goods are part 
of the same whole. Created beings have been constructed with an 
inherent attraction to their unique perfection and good, and so 
Augustine's ontology reaffirms that God has willed a good world, 
a world in which both individuals and their complementary goods 
are coterminous. At the same time, God has also willed a world in 
which all of these same individuals appear to be inclined to their 
natural respite and stability. 
Section Hl.a: Justice, Order and the Ramifications of these 
in the Augustinian Ethic 
In De Civitas Dei, Augustine develops a general theme at the 
heart of his ethic. This text delineates two basic camps: For hu-
mankind those driven toward the earthly and material or those 
driven towards God and the spiritual. 
There exist no more than two kinds of society, 
which according to our scriptures, we have rightly 
called the two cities. One city is that of the men 
who live according to the flesh. The other is of 
men who live according to the spirit. Each of them 
chooses its own kind of peace and, when they at-
tain what they desire, each lives in the peace of 
their own choosing.1 7 
The basis of the two cities and types of persons is the direction 
of their love. The cities or persons which focus upon God and 
direct their wills and loves towards God are considered good, while 
those cities and persons which direct their wills and loves towards 
the world are considered sinful. 
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What we see, then, is that two societies have is-
sued from two kinds of love. Worldly society has 
flowered from a selfish love which dared to de-
spise even God, whereas the communion of saints 
is rooted in a love of God that is ready to trample 
on self. In a word, this latter relies on the Lord, 
whereas the other boasts that it can get along by 
itself.18 
The well directed loves illustrative of the heavenly city and person 
prompt both peace and joy, but, at the same time, they also are the 
end result of justice. And it is precisely this justice which orders 
or arranges the various parts of the human being back towards its 
good and proper place of rest and stability. Justice is that virtue 
which liberates the human person and reunifies this person with 
their inherent drive towards their good. In other words, justice 
orders the human in such a way so as to find eudaemonia and health. 
Justice, for Augustine, is the result of the city or person being 
ruled by the one supreme God and His grace so that: 
...it sacrifices to none but him, and whereby, in 
all the citizens of this obedient city, the soul con-
sequently rules the body and reason the vices in 
the rightful order, so that as the individual just man, 
so also the community and people of the just, live 
by faith, which works by love, that love whereby 
man loves God as he ought to be loved, and his 
neighbor as himself.19 
The essence of Augustinian justice can be understood as consist-
ing in right order since this virtue is concerned with the ordering 
of the various parts within the whole: God, soul, reason, body, 
vices, and loves. But justice also includes the right ordering of 
other objects. It includes right order in that the worse is controlled 
by the better, all that is equal is given its proper due and is domi-
nated neither by that which is equal to it or lesser than it, and all 
the better, the equal and the lesser is regarded as it should be. Jus-
tice, too, dictates that the incorruptible, because of its superior 
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nature, is to be more esteemed than the corruptible. The same is 
true of the eternal. The eternal is recognized as superior to the 
ephemeral. God's created world is just, and as a result, in God's 
created world, the better rules the worse, the superior incorrupt-
ible controls the inferior corruptible, and the more fully real, the 
eternal, has dominion over the material and transitory.20 
There are also consequences to this just ordering. For Augus-
tine, justice prompts peace and joy. Peace and joy, then, as an 
effect of justice, are the results of proper order. God, the person, 
the soul, the loves, the reason, the body, the equal and the unequal, 
the better and the worse, the temporal and the eternal all have their 
appropriate place within the order of the whole of things. To be 
just is to live within this order. It is to establish a consonant rela-
tionship between yourself and the whole of your environment. 
Section IILb: The Augustinian Account of Justice and its 
Relationship to Nussbaum's Medical Moral Paradigm— 
Injustice and Justice as Diseased and Salutary 
Augustine's ethic advances a conception of a diseased soul 2 1, 
along with the factors producing this condition. As I have pointed 
out, Augustine's ethic concerns itself with these primary themes: 
towards which direction are the human loves oriented, what is it 
that we desire most, and do we desire and love rightly? For Au-
gustine, the human will and loves could be and always are ori-
ented towards either the transitory world or the abiding God. As a 
result, sin can be interpreted accordingly. Sin can be viewed as a 
problem of injustice and a baneful turning of the self's loves. De 
Libero Arbitrio supports this view. In this dialogue, Augustine 
comments that justice is, itself, a manifestation of the eternal, along 
with its order and law. Because of this, to turns one's loves away 
from their proper orientation and towards the temporal is to fail to 
participate in justice. To turn from the eternal order is to turn from 
justice itself, and this sinful turning has a natural consequent. This 
sinful turning produces disease, discord, and misery.2 2 Sin con-
sists of a deviation from the established, just equilibrium. It is a 
diseased turning; the sinful alignment of the person. And this dis-
eased alignment is the product of three things: an unhealthy ar-
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rangement of the person in relation to God and His creation, an 
unhealthy arrangement of the soul in accord with the body, and an 
unhealthy arrangement of reason in accord with vice. So an un-
healthy soul is a soul which fails to conform to the order of eternal 
justice and its immutable laws. For Augustine, there is most cer-
tainly a standard for disease in his ethic, and in short, this disease, 
looked at microscopically, entails being displaced from where you 
belong, thereby disturbing the equilibrium inherent in your per-
son, but also, viewed macroscopically, it is to upset the ordered 
balance of the world.23 
Conversely, the standard of health can be understood to in-
clude justice.2 4 The justly ordered life is the life avoiding the afore-
mentioned disorders, anxieties, and diseases of the human soul. If 
the soul is not just, then the soul will be sick. Accordingly, the 
healthy soul is naturally the soul without afflictions, and it is at 
peace and is both joyful and happy. Moreover, the healthy soul, 
for Augustine, is the soul that finds freedom from itself. This 
healthy soul finds liberation through loving rightly and accepting 
its rightful place in the created order. It has, speaking metaphori-
cally, "found its way home", and reunified itself with its pondus, 
its natural tendency to return to it place of repose and predeter-
mined good. 
Section IV.a: Eudaemonia and Wisdom in the 
Augustinian Ethic 
Augustine's ethic can be considered eudaemonistic. Humans, 
by nature, he believes, pursue the good. Humans naturally seek 
their good, and this good can be re-articulated as happiness. There-
fore, humans naturally desire happiness, and it is happiness which, 
alone, gives them true satisfaction.25 
Augustine argues that happiness includes a right satisfaction, 
but a right satisfaction abiding in nature. God solely satisfies this 
requirement. 
In no way do we doubt that if anyone has decided 
to be happy, he must secure for himself what is 
permanent, what no misfortune, however grave, 
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can snatch away. Therefore, whoever possesses 
God is happy.26 
Happiness is a satisfaction by means of the eternal God. But, 
in De Beata Vita, Augustine explores the nature of happiness more 
fully and concludes that happiness should likewise be understood 
as the "fullness" of satisfaction. Moreover, this fullness of satis-
faction can rightly be understood as "wisdom", while wisdom, 
consists of a satisfaction of desire between the extremes of excess 
and deficiency and so has the quality of right measure or propor-
tion. As such, wisdom is a measuring, a measuring the desires 
rightly. Because of this, Augustine comments that the wise man 
has a full soul and lacks nothing and so is the rightly satisfied man. 
We should see who is not in need, for he will be 
wise and happy. 'Folly' is a synonym for 'need' 
and this word usually signifies a kind of sterility 
and lack. Wisdom is fullness and in fullness there 
is measure; therefore the measure in the mind is 
wisdom. For wisdom is nothing but the measure 
of the soul, that is, that by which the mind is liber-
ated so that it neither runs over into too much nor 
falls short of fullness.27 
As is obvious from this passage, it appears that to Augustine 
wisdom frees the soul from the extremes enslaving it. Wisdom is 
that proper measure28 of gratification fostering the liberation of 
the soul by averting its demise through the surplus or paucity of 
desire. Wisdom, though, is not merely some right formula of sat-
isfaction existing independently from God. Wisdom can have no 
nature separate from God since Augustine argues in this dialogue 
that there is no wisdom other than the wisdom of God. Further-
more, what we call wisdom, he says, is actually truth. For Augus-
tine, this wisdom or measure is the very same truth existing through 
God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It appears that the authentic 
satisfaction of the soul consists in acquiring, enjoying, and living 
within this wisdom and truth whose source is the triune God. 
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This therefore, is the complete satisfaction of 
souls, that is the happy life: to know precisely 
and perfectly Him through whom you are led 
into the truth, the nature of the truth you enjoy, 
and the bond that connects you with the Supreme 
Measure!29 
In Augustine's writings, wisdom is additionally presented as 
dynamic process. Wisdom includes following what Augustine 
refers to, in De Libero Arbitrio, as the "right road of life." Persons 
can mature and advance in wisdom and this development is ex-
pressed by Augustine in the metaphor of "via" or road. He ex-
plains to his readers that the wisdom which leads to happiness 
must first include an idea of via.3" 
Insofar as all men seek the happy life, they do 
not err. Insofar as each man fails to follow the 
road of life that leads to happiness, although he 
may confess and profess that he is unwilling to 
arrive anywhere except at happiness, he is in er-
ror. His error is that he follows something that 
does not lead where he wishes to arrive. The 
greater his error on the road of life, the less his 
wisdom, and the farther he is from the truth in 
which the highest good is discerned and grasped. 
Moreover, when the highest good has been pur-
sued and obtained, each man becomes happy— 
which beyond a doubt is what we all wish. Just as 
it is agreed that we all wish to be happy, so it is 
agreed that we all wish to be wise, since no one 
without wisdom is happy. No man is happy ex-
cept through the highest good, which is to be found 
and included in that truth which we call wisdom. 3 1 
The dialogues only up to this point can give the reader a false 
impression about Augustine's views on the nature of the happy 
life. Up to this point, De Beata Vita reasons that happiness is to be 
acquired by means of the intelligence. After all, it appears that in 
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these dialogues Augustine reaches the conclusion that the good 
life can be considered mainly the result of knowledge—the knowl-
edge of the moderate choice and following De Libero, the moder-
ate choice realized gradually. But Monica has something impor-
tant to contribute at the end of the discussion on happiness in De 
Beata Vita. She closes this dialogue with an important qualifica-
tion. She admits that the happy life consists of knowing perfectly 
and precisely Him, and she indicates to the reader that this is to be 
achieved by being led by the virtues of faith, hope and love. 1 2 What 
this means is that the happy life is not necessarily a commodity 
acquired by the intellect alone. Monica's insight tempers this purely 
intellectualist view of happiness. The happy life is not merely an 
idea had in the mind efficacious in producing measure and its cor-
ollary happiness. Her comment places the happy life squarely 
within a Christian context. The happy life must include knowing 
and pursuing God through faith, hope, and love. Therefore, 
Augustine's discussion of happiness concludes that eudaemonia 
must be understood within the boundaries of God and a life which 
seeks God. 3 3 
Section IV.b: Development in the Wisdom of Faith, Hope, 
and Love—Climbing De Doctrina's Ladder of Love 
The exercising and effect of this life of Christian virtue is no-
where more obviously illustrated than in Augustine's, De Doctrina 
Christiana. In Book II of De Doctrina, Augustine employs, si-
lently, the metaphor he introduces in De Libero Arbitrio approxi-
mately thirty years earlier. In this latter text, Augustine concludes 
that the acquisition of the happy life is a slow process akin to walk-
ing a road or highway. But, in the former text, Augustine utilizes 
this previous metaphor and maps out a progressive spiritual road 
towards what can be considered the human good—eudaemonia. 
This dynamic movement of the soul, through various stages to-
wards happiness, is what I will term, "via spiritus."34 And this 
pursuit, Augustine admits in this text, is a matter of seven succes-
sive and advancing stages characterizing the person's spiritual 
evolution towards their final good. 
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The initial step in this process is one of humble, respectful 
recognition of God's reality and presence. The return to God starts 
with a fear of God, prompting persons to become acutely aware of 
their own mortality and eventual future judgment. This fear leads 
to the second rung in the evolution of via spiritus. Out of this fear 
is generated the ability to "grow modest with piety, and not con-
tradict the divine scripture, whether we have understood it when it 
lashes our vices, or whether we have not understood it, as though 
we could have better ideas and make better rules ourselves."35 The 
virtue of piety, for Augustine, begins to introduce a Christian nov-
ice to genuine knowledge, a knowledge recognized as the right 
precepts of life: love of God first and foremost, and your neighbor 
as yourself. Furthermore, Augustine asserts that this knowledge is 
tinged with the hope of victory over self and the resultant drawing 
closer to God thereby. He writes, "this knowledge, filled with 
hope, leads one to bewail oneself, not to vaunt oneself; and in this 
frame of mind one begs with assiduous prayer for the consolation 
of divine help, to prevent one from being crushed with despair."36 
The fourth stage is defined by a single virtuous desire, the 
Augustinian motif returns and there is an exclusive desire for jus-
tice. Augustine describes the spiritual temperament of this fourth 
stage as one which, by way of fortitude and courage, aims at satis-
fying the craving for justice. The end result of this craving is a 
struggle with the will, and the desired aim of this fourth stage is 
the elimination of wrong loves. Next, the fifth stage is the result 
of the fourth stage's success. Only after the wrong loves have 
been mastered and effaced, can the person begin to develop the 
appropriate loves of the fifth stage. And so the fourth stage seeks 
to eliminate wrong loves, while the fifth stage seeks to re-habitualize 
the person in the way of right love - love of God and neighbor as 
self. In addition, this perfected love further promotes the hope and 
unimpaired powers 3 7 that leads to the sixth stage: the stage, "at 
which you purge and clean those eyes with which God can be seen, 
insofar as he can by those who die to this world, insofar as they 
can."3" This stage cleans the heart and mind so that the person is 
prepared to usher in the final stage: the stage available to those 
who are single-minded and pure in heart.39 These persons Augus-
tine describes as climbing up to wisdom, the wisdom of peace and 
tranquillity.40 
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In reality, the virtues of faith, hope, and love spoken of overtly 
in the Cassiciacum dialogue of his early years, De Beta Vita, are 
covertly the primary constituents of De Doctrina's via spiritus. 
De Doctrina catalogues the Christian virtues in their dynamic, 
existential playing out within concrete human experience. This is 
evident when one examines the early stages of Augustine's evolu-
tionary spiritual scale. This examination brings to light the fact 
that fear of God, piety, submission to the knowledge of God and a 
life devoted to neighbor as self are all embedded in the fundamen-
tals of Augustinian faith experience. Without faith, there is no 
God to fear, submit to, or a revealed scripture which expresses the 
few, but important, truths inaccessible to the now crippled, un-
aided human intellect. Moreover, in these early stages hope is 
augmented as one climbs further up the via spiritus. Neither is the 
final Christian virtue to be forgotten in Augustine's spiritual as-
cent. In fact, the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh stages of via 
spiritus are primarily organized around this idea of love. In these 
later stages the idea of concrete, Christian, existential love is be-
ing shaped and worked. The self's wrong loves, with time and 
God's grace, are purged. This cleansing of love is not without its 
purpose voiced in the fourth stage as the person's struggle for jus-
tice. In De Doctrina, this struggle culminates in a vision of Chris-
tian wisdom as love. 
Sapientia (wisdom) is understood by Augustine on a series of 
different levels. There are those interpretations already discussed 
in De Beata Vita such as fullness of satisfaction, or the true mea-
sure between excess and deficiency. The young Augustine pen-
ning this early dialogue presumes that wisdom must be reasoned 
out as the authentic satisfaction of desire by way of an actively 
progressive life in faith, hope and love. And this wisdom attained 
in God is true wisdom. The via spiritus of De Doctrina subsumes 
all of these various interpretations of wisdom found in the early 
dialogue, but also adds others, namely, the themes of justice and 
love, found repeatedly throughout much of the more mature Au-
gustinian corpus. 
In De Civitas Dei, as addressed earlier in this paper, justice is 
a matter of giving each its appropriate due, and, in like manner, 
Augustine's process of spiritual reawakening requires learning to 
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give each of the various objects of love their appropriate due. Jus-
tice demands that the better be preferred to the worse, the eternal 
Trinity to the objects of the temporal world, brother and sister loved 
in God and as an equal to yourself. The final stage in the spiritual 
life includes first successfully mastering the problems of the ear-
lier stages. Accordingly, the seventh and last stage requires that 
one first struggle with the craving for justice, a desire demanding 
that one learn to love ordinately. De Doctrina asserts that in the 
way of the spirit, there can be no wisdom of the seventh stage 
without there first being the struggle of the earlier stages for jus-
tice. To be wise is to love justly, giving each object in life its 
appropriate due. 
But the grace-inspired life of faith, hope, and love seems ori-
ented towards yet another way of interpreting wisdom that I will 
term, "sapientia caritatis"41. Augustine's via spiritus concludes 
that the final, highest stage of the spiritual life is that stage in which 
the mind and heart have been purified in love and actively hosts 
the reciprocally infectious love of God. As a result, in De Doctrina, 
sapientia caritatis appears to be the terminus or aim of via spiri-
tus, and as such is the final human condition described by Augus-
tine as enjoyment in peace and tranquillity. Eudaemonia, the good 
for humanity, happiness, Augustine interprets in other texts, again 
such as De Civitas Dei, as precisely a matter of this very same 
peace and tranquillity. And so Augustine's way of the spirit de-
scribes the powerful, grace-inspired movement through a life of 
faith, hope, and love towards sapientia caritatis: a reordering of 
the self, in love, so as to cause a re-spiritualization of self and 
world. Sapientia caritatis, thus, gives rise to a symbiosis of indi-
vidual entities, a harmony of what was before disparate parts within 
the infusing love of God. Within this love, the person more fully 
and perfectly integrates, and in like manner the community of per-
sons more fully integrates; they become a unity of beings within 
God's presence of love, all of their concerns equal, all their lives 
unified in the uniform love of God and each other in God. Peace 
and tranquillity in unanimity and reintegration is established. The 
human good is achieved and all persons find health by way of this 
love. 
But Augustine does not arrive at this vision alone. Thus, this 
Augustinian vision of love develops out of St. Paul's exhortation 
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in / S I Corinthians, Chapter 13. In brief, in this chapter, Paul con-
siders the primacy of love. Language and the most eloquent of 
words, are mere nonsensical sounds if not uttered within the pres-
ence of God as Love. Knowledge, another human good, is mere 
foolishness, if Divine Love is not working in the background of 
the mind at labor. Faith, likewise, is paralyzed and empty if not 
quickened by Sacred Love. And in the end, for Paul, there seems 
to be only three significant constituents to reality: to believe in 
faith, to long in hope, and to care in love. But in time, like all else, 
faith and hope fade away. Ultimately, faith is understood, hope is 
realized, and so it is love alone that can be said to endure. 
Augustine's via spiritus emphasizes this same Pauline vision. 
To be sure, faith and hope are most necessary but only as corner-
stones for a genuine human happiness understood as an intoxicat-
ing love of God permeating the soul and life of the person, creat-
ing a salubrious unity in the presence of multiplicity. For Augus-
tine, this love is the human good; it is the health and happiness of 
the human soul; it is eudaemonia. In unison, these three grace-
inspired Christian virtues are the most medicinal of all virtues. 
They act so as to guide the person towards a eudaemonia embody-
ing the salutary, loving peace that comes of a just order, an order 
of love rooted in faith and carrying a sole hope in both the order's 
love and the Orderer which is love. 
Section IV.c: The Augustinian Account of Eudaemonia and 
Wisdom and their Relationship to Nussbaum's Medical 
Moral Paradigm 
As addressed earlier, Nussbaum believes that all medical 
moral philosophies contain certain unique elements or features 
distinguishing them from other types of moral philosophies. She 
argues that medical moral philosophies invariably aim at happi-
ness and the human good—eudaemonia—understood as the health 
of the human soul. As explained in this section, Augustine's ethic 
likewise aims at the human good since it is eudaemonistic, and, as 
such, happiness is its aim. 
In Augustine's ethic, eudaemonia can easily be considered 
the standard of health and sapientia caritatis can be considered 
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synonymous with eudaemonia.'4 2 Given that this is so, in 
Augustine's ethic, the flourishing life might be understood as the 
life of faith, hope, and a most perfect, just love. 
It can be concluded that the arguments concerning happiness 
and the well-lived life are practical43 in nature. Simply, these 
eudaemonistic views and positions attempt to make the person 
better. They attempt to produce the health and happiness of the 
soul in this life and the next. Self improvement entails following 
the progressive stages of via spiritus towards sapientia caritatis. 
Augustine's eudaemonistic ethic can be considered respon-
sive to the deep wishes or needs of people.4 4 In fact, Augustine's 
ethic can be considered a prime example of this responsiveness. 
At its core, Augustine's ethic is above all concerned with human 
needs, desires, and aspirations. The wisdom of love, as a goal of 
action, is that perfecting idea and power which prioritizes, orga-
nizes, measures, and orders the various needs, desires, loves, and 
longings. Seen from this point of view, the very essence of his 
ethic, then, includes the arrangement of profound individual wishes, 
needs and longings. 
The arguments of Augustine are responsive to the particular 
case. 4 5 Augustine's eudaemonistic ethic is an ethic of the particu-
lar individual and their loves, and so his ethic's aim is to reach out 
to the individual and their particular situation. This responsive-
ness includes a reorganization of the complete life of the individual 
and is achieved by the daily reorganization of the particular indi-
viduals loves, beliefs and choices. Augustine's ethic attempts to 
achieve his most important objective: the health and salvation of 
the particular individual soul in this life and the next. 
Section V: The Augustinian Account of Grace and its Rela-
tionship to Nussbaum's Medical Moral Paradigm 
For Augustine, God is the source of all goodness. So in 
Augustine's world view, all good things flow from the perfect good-
ness of God. In addition, all of the various goods which God brings 
about are freely given as gratuitous acts of the infinite generosity 
of the infinitely good God. In this sense, even the goodness of the 
universe, its beings and unique existence, is attributable to the freely 
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chosen, creative act of God. The grace of God, then, can be con-
sidered so all-pervasive that even the created order, along with all 
that is within it, can be viewed as a manifestation of His gracious 
gift. Gilson comments: 
Since God is the sovereign good, He is self suffi-
cient; hence, all his gifts are freely given and gra-
tuitously, and in this sense every one of his works 
is a grace. Man did not have to merit existence, 
because to merit it he would first have had to ex-
ist. Now although he did not exist, he was made, 
and made, not only like a stone or animal, but to 
his creator's image. In this improper sense, even 
nature itself must be a grace, but a universal grace 
so to speak, and common to everything."46 
Where, then, did evil come from in this world that was created 
by God? In order to explain evil in God's perfectly created order, 
Augustine insists that through one willful act of disobedience, by 
a pair of beings who were made good, but not perfectly good, evil 
came into the world. The first man and woman, Adam and Eve, 
were beings who, because of their nature, were susceptible to cor-
ruption.47 They were liable to be corrupted and eventually were 
corrupted by their own free choice to disobey the commandment 
of God, subsequently, distancing themselves from God. Adam 
and Eve's baneful, pernicious choice introduced evil into an inno-
cent world, and, according to Augustine, the original sin of this 
first man and woman corrupted all. 4 8 Through this first sin, hu-
manity was forever distanced from God, human beings were ori-
ented away from their good and towards its opposite: error, 
concupiscence and death. With the fall, humanity relinquished 
the power to free itself from inordinate and wrongly ordered loves, 
thereby losing its ability to love properly and acquired a misguided 
orientation of desire. In short, after the fall, humans became pre-
disposed to loving the wrong things in the wrong way, or the right 
things wrongly. However, they did so freely.49 For Augustine, 
human beings freely chose to distance themselves from God, ha-
bitually reoriented their loves away from the eternal, and justly 
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deserve the rightful fruits of this choice: sin, misery, error, and 
death. 
The fall initiated a tendency towards a wrong-turning, and 
Augustine argues that now grace counters this condition. Grace is 
that gift from God which corrects the fallen nature of humankind 
because it strengthens a crippled human nature and reorients its 
will and loves. Likewise, grace prompts the virtues of faith, hope, 
love, wisdom, and justice. Now grace reestablishes the liberty of 
the human person; it liberates humans from their ill-directed loves 
when it strengthens humans' will and ability to redirect themselves 
towards the eternal. Grace allows persons to become faithful, hope-
ful, loving, wise, and just when it allows persons to recognize God's 
will and God's just law and act upon them.5 0 
Grace produces the good for humankind in two very different 
ways. First, grace, as a gratuitous act of God's self giving, is be-
hind the created order. It is by means of the grace of God that the 
world exists in the unique, good way that it does. The world is 
good and it is a gift from God that the world is created as such. 
After the fall though, grace plays a new, different role in hu-
man health and happiness. Grace, Augustine credits for the ability 
to believe in God faithfully,51 and it is out of this faith that both 
hope and love flow. To have grace-inspired faith is to have the 
prerequisite for the other saving virtues. Moreover, Augustine 
believes that these three simple virtues—faith, hope, and love— 
now have the most salutary of effects for the human person. 
And so for Augustine, there does appear to be a method or 
procedure which produces happiness, peace, and joy for the hu-
man soul. However, this procedure or method is primarily spiri-
tual. This method is what Augustine calls "grace."52 
Section VI: Augustine's Confessiones—Picturing De 
Doctrina's Progressive Life of Faith, Hope, and Love—A 
Case in Point of an Exemplum 
Augustine's Confessiones can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways. But when interpreted within the context of his other writ-
ings, especially De Doctrina, this extended prayer to God might 
be easily seen and understood as the story of a diseased soul pro-
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curing health by way of progressive advancement in faith, hope, 
and love. 
First, regarding the theme of disease, the first nine books of 
the Confessiones catalogue Augustine's attempts to relieve him-
self of his wrong loves, these loves being functions of the mis-
applied individual, unique powers given to the man. Augustine's 
mind was strong, his rhetorical powers of persuasion titanic, but 
by his own admission, these talents of mind and tongue, he per-
verted, devoting them to a life pursuing vainglory, reputation, 
power, convenience, and lust. This mis-direction of his time and 
aptitudes, he recalls, brought about his living death and were not 
without their adverse effects. He acquired envied teaching posi-
tions, money, ease of life, children and, in later life, a wife of repu-
tation, but none of these could satisfy a longing within. Happiness 
eluded him in spite of these temporal goods in abundance, and so 
in his early life, sorrow and malaise are his most constant posses-
sions. Describing this condition he later attributes to his sinful-
ness, he writes: 
In this lay my sin, that not in him was I seeking 
pleasure, distinctions and truth, but in myself and 
the rest of his creatures, and so I fell headlong 
into pains, confusions and errors.53 
And nowhere is the unhealthy condition of his soul portrayed 
with as much clarity as in the account of the beggar in Book VI. 
By way of this experience, Augustine represents the shallow na-
ture of his life's intention, side by side the emptiness in mind and 
heart. In Book VI, Augustine sets out to describe a seemingly 
everyday, mundane occurrence. He explains that one day, while 
passing through a district in Milan, he happens upon a common 
beggar, described as intoxicated and so joyful. This chance meet-
ing, more strongly than ever, forces Augustine to question the di-
rection of his life and the thrust of his life's ambitions. This stimu-
lates an examination of his life up to this point. On the one hand, 
he understands that he might easily be considered successful in the 
eyes of others: After all, he is a teacher of rhetoric in an important 
city like Milan; he is a man of letters, erudite, powerful in his 
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persuasion, and respected. Yet, in spite of these accomplishments, 
Augustine realizes that, in fact, he is to be pitied. The drunken 
beggar compels Augustine to confront his grief. The childhood 
beatings meant to motivate more assiduous study habits (but prob-
ably only produced a disdain for learning Greek), the struggle of 
his later formal education in Carthage, the financial burden his 
father bore for his education, all of these labors, in addition to 
others, Augustine concluded produced nothing but anguish and 
sorrow. Hence, in his own mind, he became dejected, humbled by 
a common drunk begging for his happiness. In spite of all of his 
learning and reputation, the drunken beggar had acquired what was 
eluding him. The beggar was drunk, but happy, and Augustine 
was respected and learned, but hollow. 
His joy was no true joy, to be sure, but what I was 
seeking in my ambition was a joy far more unreal; 
and he was undeniably happy while I was full of fore-
boding; he was carefree, I apprehensive.54 
Admittedly then, Augustine's condition was despondent, de-
void of what he most longed for. In Book VIII he admits that this 
condition was gradually ameliorated, starting with the famous con-
version experience in the garden. Contiguously prior to this scene 
though, Augustine describes his painful life amidst the bonds of 
spiritual death. Moreover, he expresses ideas important to under-
standing this event as a linguistic picturing of De Doctrina's via 
spiritus. 
In the passages just prior to the conversion scene, Augustine 
alludes to his experience of God at this point in his life. The God 
pictured is an angry God, vengeful in nature and exacting a heavy 
toll for his misdeeds. His God is a deity to be feared, and August-
ine respects this God. Also there is relayed to the readers a tenor 
similar to one that might be felt at a final judgment. Augustine, 
viscerally, feels himself as sinful in the presence of this stern God, 
and so calls out for an imperative mercy. 
O Lord, how long? How long? Will you be angry 
forever? Do not remember our age old sins." For 
MEDICINAL PROPERTIES OF AUGUSTINE 25 
by these I was conscious of being held prisoner. I 
uttered cries of misery.55 
And so just prior to the scene of conversion, Augustine introduces 
themes consisting of: fear of God, the judgement before God, and 
memory of one's mortality (spiritual death). The beginning steps 
of De Doctrina's ladder of love have been ascended. 
In his introduction to the conversion scene, Augustine starts 
by way of describing the event through which God responded to 
his need. He laments his sins, along with his impotence in the face 
of them. 
I went on talking like this and weeping in the in-
tense bitterness of my broken heart. Suddenly I 
heard a voice of some boy or girl, I do not know -
singing over and over again, 'Pick up and read, 
pick it up and read.'5 6 
Augustine believed this to be no ordinary voice. To him, this was 
the voice of the loving God providentially at work within his life. 
This voice beckoned Augustine to pick up the Pauline Letters where 
he read: 
Not in dissipation and drunkenness, nor in de-
bauchery and lewdness, nor in arguing and jeal-
ousy; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make 
no provision for the flesh or the gratification of 
your desires.5 7 
This passage gave Augustine a renewed sense of hope. The voice 
of the child was the utterance of God reacting to his plea for help 
in love. God displayed his mercy, a mercy which lead to the hope 
of resisting his weak will. Following this experience, Augustine 
sees himself anew as Monica's dream had foretold. He was fi-
nally "standing on the rule of faith"58 resulting in a surge of hope 
and redirection of love. This newly infused hope was a hope in the 
ability to overcome himself, thereby purifying his wrong love and 
learning to love justly all things. Still later in Book IX, Augustine 
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describes the effects of his rejuvenated and unimpaired spirit. Soon, 
after this encounter of grace, he hints at an empowered love of 
others and self.59 
Augustine's conversion produced a more dominant love of God 
portrayed as an increased love of others, along with its subsequent 
ability to unite persons. Alone and looking out over a garden, 
Monica and Augustine join in mystical experience. 
...we lifted ourselves in longing yet more ardent 
toward That Which Is, and step by step, traversed 
all bodily creatures and heaven itself, whence sun, 
and moon and stars shed their light upon the earth. 
Higher still we mounted by inward thought and 
wondering discourse on your works, and we ar-
rived at the summit of our own minds; and this 
too we transcended, to touch that land of never 
failing plenty where you pasture Israel for ever 
with the food of truth."' 
For Augustine, this ecstatic encounter is a precursor to the perfect 
unification to come of all persons in the love of God, but yet, this 
passage illustrates something more, the effects of God's love in 
this world as well. Simply, this passage pictures two persons fus-
ing in love, a love that seems to reach beyond their distinct indi-
viduality. Consequently, the ecstatic experience of Augustine and 
Monica portrays sapientia caritatis, unity in love. 
But the love of God also is shown to have a therapeutic effect 
in the life of Augustine. In the chronology of his life, Augustine 
writes that this conversion experience produced in him the goods 
absent in his earlier life. The beggar episode made clear to Augus-
tine the facile nature of his early life. His younger years were 
spent pursuing shallow ambitions and the result of this was a per-
sistent dissatisfaction. Something was missing. Augustine, post 
conversion, is able to brand himself more peaceful and happy. 
Something has been found. The life of Christian virtue allowed 
Augustine to advance down the path of eudaemonistic, perfect love, 
and this was therapeutic for him. Speaking in the language of sin, 
the post conversion Augustine writes of this lately discovered peace 
and contentment: 
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My mind was free at last from the gnawing need 
to seek advancement and riches, to welter in filth 
and scratch my itching lust.61 
After his conversion, Augustine portrays himself, due to the redi-
rection of his loves and life, as finding more peace and happiness 
through liberation from the diseased bonds of sin and vice. By 
ascending the ladder of love through faith and hope, Augustine is 
more fully integrated in himself and unified with others. By way 
of development in faith and hope, he has a new insight into the 
wisdom of love. 
In the Confessiones, Augustine paints a picture of both a dis-
eased, anxious, dissatisfied, life, but also a more healthy, peaceful, 
happy life. Augustine does not merely express arguments and ideas 
in this text, but testifies to two very different people and lives— 
the happy satisfied life of Christian virtue, along with its opposite. 
It is not by an act of caprice that Augustine chose to express the 
ideas inherent in his ethic according to this autobiographical 
method. Instead, Augustine chose to express himself and his sys-
tem in this way, since this medium, distinctively, expressed his 
system most effectively. And this type of expression, by 
Nussbaum's own account, is a staple of the medical moral para-
digm. 
Section VI: Grace, Its Reconciliation with the 
Autonomous Human Good, and the Otherworldly 
Dimension of the Life of Eudaemonia—the Problems of 
Compatibility Explained and Resolved 
At this point, I think a set of obvious problems comes to light 
that can now finally be addressed. Concerning the role of grace in 
Augustine's ethic, I think it may appear that grace looks to be lo-
cus of the human good. After all, since the fall, grace is required 
to merely believe, while belief is a prerequisite for taking God's 
just law seriously and attempting to develop and perfect the law of 
love in the course of a human life. Furthermore, it is by way of 
perfecting the law of love that human happiness and well being is 
produced. Therefore, it might be concluded that God's grace is 
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that which promotes health and happiness, rather than the nature 
of the being itself. 
All of this appears true, but a more detailed examination of the 
problem shows that Augustine's ethic presupposes, too, that hu-
manity, by a gracious act of God, was originally constructed ac-
cording to the good. Augustine's ontology argues that the human 
good was originally part of ourselves, however we chose to dis-
tance ourselves from this good and must, henceforth, pay the pen-
alty. Originally, by way of the gratuitous gift of God's creation, 
God intended that humans provide themselves with their own well 
being. In fact, according to Augustinian ontology, He gave human 
beings the tools necessary to achieve their good by weaving their 
good into the natural fabric of their being. 
Thus, I believe Nussbaum fails to interpret Augustine both as 
Christian devotee, exclusively devoted to revealed scripture, but 
also as a philosopher/theologian concerned with ontological ques-
tions of being. Given this, she appears unable to sufficiently rec-
ognize the complexity of Augustine's religious vision, and hence 
understand how, within his system, grace might be reconciled with 
an independent human good. 
Bourke s views on Augustine's ontology helps to make 
sense of this reconciliation. Bourke contends that the locus of the 
human good is yet more subtle. The good for human beings, looked 
at from the biblical point of view solely, as Nussbaum does, con-
cludes rightly that the locus of the human good is to be found in an 
overly simplistic view of grace, and also the biblical injunctions of 
an all powerful, commanding Other. But, as Bourke would have 
us believe, from the more nuanced outlook of Augustine's Chris-
tian ontology, the locus of the human good re-adjusts its origin, 
finding itself nestled securely within the ontological fabric of the 
created human being and its experience. Regarding grace and its 
relationship to the human good, Nussbaum, then, fails to suffi-
ciently and comprehensively examine Augustine the Christian in-
tellectual. Considering Augustine's views in their totality, 
Nussbaum would have found, I believe, that according to the Au-
gustinian Christian ethic, and its supportive ontological structure, 
the good for humankind originates in God's grace, but also hu-
man being. God's will and God's gracious gift are behind the 
construction of the human being, but the human being along with 
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its coterminous good. In a word, ontologically speaking, for Au-
gustine, the human good might be considered human innocence, 
and human innocence is real. 
A second problem might include the "otherworldly" dimen-
sion to Augustinian eudaemonia. After all, for Augustine, perfect 
integration and unity is an actualized condition only outside of 
time and in an eternal after life. The objection might be made that 
Augustinian eudaemonia lacks concreteness since the soul can 
never find health and happiness in the world in which we all now 
find ourselves. The Augustinian ethic, however, might respond to 
this objection by claiming that in regard to its "concrete" charac-
ter, its account of eudaemonia is no different than any other medi-
cal moral philosophy. In reality all medical moral philosophies 
work within the same concrete world, and because of the nature of 
this world, the health of the human soul is always only quantifiably 
established, meaning, that for all medical moral philosophies, 
eudaemonia is never perfectly realized, and if realized, is so only 
in degrees. Augustine's ethic is no different in this regard. 
This temporal world often presents itself as threatening and 
hostile. Consider again the very aim of philosophizing in the Hel-
lenistic world given by Nussbaum herself. It was the urgent need 
for health. Remembering that you only need what is lacking, by 
her own admission, what was lacking in the concrete lives of per-
sons of that period was human health. The world in that period, 
like all others, testifies to a single, recurring fact: our human con-
dition is difficult, potentially riddled with adversities and prob-
lems. In short, the world is not clean, and never has been. Fur-
thermore, this view seems a given to all medical moral philoso-
phies. This concrete world allows the human being only degrees 
of health, thus, the aim of the medical moral philosophy is quanti-
fied healing. In other words, given the state of the world—imper-
fect, temporal and in flux—circumstances change, while these 
changes at times do not promote our well being. The human good 
can only be acquired to some degree, as our health today will be 
disturbed tomorrow, or the next day, etc. 
In further support of this claim, consider one of Nussbaum's 
"legitimate" medical moral philosophies—the Stoic. The Stoic 
ethic reconciled the hostile nature of the world, on the one hand, 
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and their vision of goodness, on the other, by prescribing suicide 
in certain situations, even for the "battle hardened" Stoic sage. 
The most ethically advanced then, that person most healed by the 
therapeutic philosophy, had to confront the idea of eudaemonia as 
measured. Perfect and absolute health was beyond the scope of 
the potentiality of this world. This seems a fact to the Stoic ethic, 
and what's more, the Stoic ethic, itself, as medicinal, was a re-
sponse to this fact. The world was potentially an antagonistic place 
and tomorrow fate may prove too much for reason to combat. The 
Stoic sage could find a measure of happiness through submission 
to reason, but because of the nature of the world, this health and 
happiness was tenuous. According to the breezes of fate, health 
could be eliminated at any moment and often was. Suicide turns 
out to be a recognition that pain was a potential, constant reality 
impinging on health. Perfect health was impossible, and 
eudaemonia was a matter of degree then even for the sage. 
The consequent of this is the view that quantifiably, in a medi-
cal moral philosophy, one might always have more and less health. 
Like the Stoic ethic, the Augustinian assumes the world as is and 
makes no grand offers. The world is a sometimes dangerous, some-
times beautiful place, full of pain potentially, and joy potentially, 
but consistently, the world is full of God's presence and love. This 
ethic does believe that, in this concrete world, more health is ac-
quired through approximating the love of God by way of Chris-
tian virtue. God is present in the world before our eyes, and his 
ethic promotes a necessary responsiveness to this concrete world, 
not only the next world hoped for. Indeed, the Augustinian ethic 
presumes that our ability to perceive God's love will grow more 
intense in an after life, but this belief does not preclude the con-
cern the ethic gives to this world and its projects. God is present 
concretely. The beauty, truth, and goodness of this world reas-
sures Augustine of this reality. His ethic, then, entails straddling 
the Civitas Dei, but also the civitas mundi. A foot must be kept in 
each. This ethic's vision appreciates the person as ideally advanc-
ing through this good but imperfect world, more often than not, 
gaining a measure of peace and joy as one advances in caritas, but 
likewise keeping in sight the hope of God's eternal vision. The via 
spiritus and Augustine's Confessiones illustrate this eudaemonistic 
movement of the soul through the ephemeral life. True, this ethic 
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concludes that the eternal life to come will perfectly restore our 
happy innocence, but even in this temporal world, the diseases and 
pains which are so real can, to some extent, be assuaged. In mea-
sure only, health can be established here and now, but a measured 
health and happiness is a real health and happiness, even if not 
perfectly realized. For Augustine then, eudaemonia is concrete as 
well as otherworldly since God's love is omnipresent, and our abil-
ity to perceive and cleave to this love is a matter of our will. 
Conclusion 
Martha Nussbaum claims that the Augustinian ethic cannot be 
considered medical because it fails to arise out of human being, its 
needs, desires, and aspirations. This is her principal problem with 
this ethic and the fundamental reason why she precludes this ethic 
from the category of medical moral. In retrospect, this paper ar-
gued that, according to the Augustinian ethic, God, the whole of 
His good created order, and the love inherent in this order, is pre-
cisely the proper end of the various needs, desires, and aspirations 
universally given within individual human experience. Augustine's 
ethic implicitly draws this conclusion: the health and happiness of 
the human soul requires a reunification of the self with its natural 
coterminous good. This reunification, though, can only be accom-
plished when a right relationship has been formed between the 
image of Love within and the Perfect Love without. In short, this 
reunification requires reuniting the loves of the inner self with the 
extraneous God, His just order, creation and the infinitely rich love 
given within all of these. In a sense, this reunification involves, 
simultaneously, a self-forgetting, but also a self-recalling. For 
Augustine, this reunification entails a forgetting of the present self, 
its errant beliefs, loves, and passions, and a remembering of one's 
original self, that self which was once healthy, happy, peaceful, 
and joyful since it loved as it ought. Now though, God must assist 
humans in their endeavor to both forget and remember, and He 
does this. God showers humankind with the greatest of all pos-
sible gifts—the power to love, not as we do, but as is best. For 
Augustine, by means of His grace, God does so will this, His greatest 
desire: that we all simply forget ourselves and return home. And 
if only we would share in God's greatest desire, then what He and 
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we most want would come to pass. We would find again our hu-
man innocence lost. 
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Notes 
1. Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Prac-
tice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Pg. 15. Again, this quote alludes to the idea that in the Hellenistic period 
philosophy's task was to respond to "the urgency of human suffering." 
Philosophy's function, then, was medicinal; it cured the soul through re-
alizing and living out another goal of philosophizing—eudaemonia or 
human flourishing. 
2. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Ppg. 21-22. 
Nussbaum claims, "We do not in fact look 'out there' for ethical truth; it 
is in and of our human lives. As in the case of health, what we are look-
ing for is something that we are trying to bring about in human life, some-
thing essentially practical, whose point is living and living well. This 
something is unlikely to be grasped if we detach ourselves completely 
from our wishes and needs and aims. It must be found, if at all, from 
within ourselves and one another, as what answers the deepest aspira-
tions we have for ourselves and one another. And it is justified as correct 
by the fact that it does so answer." 
3. Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire. Ppg. 17-25. 
Nussbaum argues that Plato's conception of ethics cannot be considered 
medical because it is essentially divorced from the domain of human life. 
Medical ethics attempts to treat the human soul, and as such it must find 
its foundation in the human being, its needs, aspirations, and life. With 
medical ethics, the idea is that you treat the patient by examining the 
patient, not some Form. So both the problem and cure come from the 
patient and their life. According to Plato's conception, Nussbaum ar-
gues, ethical truth first begins by way of investigation of an immaterial 
and unchanging Form or Archetype. According to Plato's vision, the 
ethical norms which guide human life do not arise from human life, but 
instead, a perfect and unchanging Idea. The divorce between ethics and 
the human being, Nussbaum contends, leads to the real possibility that, 
"The best life may turn out to be a life that none of us could attain, or 
even that none of us could grasp or envisage. Or, again, it might turn out 
to be a life that is so out of line with all actual human ways of life, and 
with all actual human desires, that human beings as they are would find it 
repugnant, or base, or so boring or impoverished that they would die 
rather than live it." As far as the conception of traditional social belief is 
concerned, Nussbaum believes that this view of ethics is not medical but 
simply mimetic. In other words, this view, she argues, understands eth-
ics not as something which fosters the health of the person, but merely as 
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a series of beliefs which can be traced back to the society at large. Ethical 
beliefs have no real value outside of social utility and their basis too is 
grounded in the beliefs of society at large. The ethical beliefs of indi-
viduals, then, are merely the parroting or mimicking of communal be-
liefs. 
4. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Pg. 18. 
5. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Pg. 18. 
6. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Pg. 19. 
7. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Pg. 19. 
8. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Pg. 26. Nussbaum 
insists that any medical moral philosophy is concerned with, "people 
whose beliefs, desires, and preferences are themselves the problem." She 
also writes that, "philosophy understood along medical lines deals with 
both beliefs and emotions or passions." (Pg. 37) All medical moral phi-
losophies are required to alter erroneous beliefs, efface irrational fears 
and anxieties, eliminate debilitating hatreds and angers, and finally re-
align harmful loves, desires, longings and wants. 
9. I call these "therapeutic tools" because they contribute to happi-
ness and the health of the human soul. They are fundamental means 
towards this end since before one can attain happiness and health one 
must be able to diagnose "disease", have a standard of "health" which 
acts as the ideal to be attained, and have some idea in mind as to the 
procedure to use which can bring one to the "healthy" condition. These 
ideas, then, are "tools" because each, in its own way, is critical for the 
construction of a healthy, happy soul. 
10. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Ppg. 28-29. 
11. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Pg. 46. 
12. Martha Nussbaum. The Therapy of Desire. Pg. 339. Other 
examples of exemption include the letters of Seneca. In these letters, 
Seneca expresses his thoughts in an imaginary conversation with a friend. 
The conversation includes highly personal testimony as to his faults and 
misgivings. He teaches about Stoicism while relating to his audience 
through his own humility. It is my impression that Nussbaum believes 
that the Stoics developed this didactic tool to its fullest extent. 
13. Vernon Bourke. Augustine's View of Reality. Villanova Press, 
1964. Pg. 18. 
14. Vernon Bourke. Augustine's View of Reality. Pg. 18. Bourke 
argues that in the Literal Commentary on Genesis, Augustine professes 
that the universe was created by God according to an order which in-
cludes measure, number, and weight. Measure, number, and weight are 
considered by Augustine the primary determinants of the world. 
15. Vernon Bourke. Augustine's View of Reality. Ppg. 20-21. 
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16. Vernon Bourke. Augustine's View of Reality. Pg. 22. The idea 
of eternal goodness and it's abiding existence within the created human 
is one of the fundamental points expressed within Augustine's ontology. 
As this paper will argue, the human good inherent in the ontological fab-
ric of the human person provides for human eudaemonia, while this 
eudaemonia is salutary. There is a correlation then, in Augustine's ethic, 
between the abiding goodness of existence and a health and happiness 
which therefrom flows. Nietzsche's philosophy gives comment regard-
ing the idea of this association. In short, I believe his philosophy rejects 
its existence. Gilles Deleuze's commentary on Nietzsche, Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, offers the thought, that for Nietzsche, "the suffering of life 
needs to be justified, that is to say redeemed from suffering and contra-
diction." (Pg.l 1) Moreover, a response to this problem of human suffer-
ing and contradiction is found in an "Apollonian" attitude to life. "He 
(Apollo) constructs the appearance of appearance, the beautiful appear-
ance, the dream or the plastic image and is thus freed from suffering: 
'Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual by the radiant glorifi-
cation of the eternity of phenomenon', he obliterates pain" (Pg. 11) Fur-
thermore, Augustine's religious and ontological vision would probably 
be considered by Nietzsche as in accord with the "ascetic ideal", an ideal 
which produces "ressentiment and bad conscience", and which "permits 
the deprecation of life and all that is active within it." (Pg. 145) In addi-
tion, the ascetic ideal includes, "the fiction of a world beyond." (Pg. 145) 
The "world beyond" might be considered the eternal and abiding world. 
The human good conceived, whether it be Nussbaum's, the Stoic, the 
Aristotelian, the Epicurean, or the Augustinian, is somehow inextricably 
bound up with that which remains firm, and as such deserves recognition 
as a more stable, firm existence. This conception of stable, abiding or 
universal existence Nietzsche would find "Apollonian" in nature. Thus, 
as a result, I believe Nietzsche would regard the medical moral philoso-
phy project as suspect, in any of its forms, and, furthermore, a fiction 
which makes life livable, but at the price of authenticity towards life. 
However, responding to Nietzsche's polemic would require another com-
plete project, and that is outside of the constraints of this paper and its 
thesis. 
17. Saint Augustine. De Civitas Dei, Corpus Christianorum, series 
latina, volumes 47-48. Pg. 260. "Non tamen amplius quam duo quaedam 
genera humanae societatis existerent, quas civitates duas secundum 
scripturas nostras merito appellare possemus. Una quippe est hominum 
secundum carnem, altera secundum spiritum vivere in sui cuiusque generis 
pace volentium et, cum id quod expetunt adsequuntur, in sui cuiusque 
generis pace viventium." I have followed the translation of Walsh, Zema, 
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Monahan, Honan in Saint Augustine: City of God. New York: Doubleday, 
1958. Pg.295. 
18. Saint Augustine. De Civitas Dei, Corpus Christianorum, series 
latina, volumes 47-48. Pg. 404. "Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores 
duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero 
amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Denique ilia ipsa, haec in Domino 
gloriatur. Ilia enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam, huic autem Deus con-
scientiae testis maxima est gloria." I have followed the translation of 
Walsh, Zema, Monahan, Honan. Pg. 321. 
19. Saint Augustine. De Civitas Dei. Corpus Christianorum, se-
ries latina, volumes 47-48. Pg. 230 "ne cuiquam sacrificet nisi tantum 
sibi, et per hoc in omnibus hominibus ad eandem civitatem pertinentibus 
atque oboedientibus Deo animus etiam corpori atque ratio vitiis ordine 
legitimo fideliter imperet, ut, quern ad modum iustus unus, ita coetus 
populusque iustorum vivat ex fide quae operatur per dilectionem, qua 
homo diligit Deum sicut diligendus est Deus, et proximum sicut semet 
ipsum." I have followed the translation of Marcus Dods. Ppg. 705-706. 
20. Saint Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will. Pg. 61. In De 
Libero Arbitrio, Augustine comments regarding justice as right order, 
saying: "Item iuste esse videndum, deteriora melioribus esse subdenda 
et paria paribus conparanda et propria suis quibusque tribuenda nonne 
fateberis esse verissimum et tarn mihi quam tibi atque omnibus id 
videntibus praesto esse communiter?" Pg. 65. "Won't you also admit the 
following to be absolutely true: that we should live justly; that the worse 
should be subordinate to the better; that equals should be compared with 
equals and to each should be given his own; and that each of these truths 
is present for me and all to see in common?" I have followed Benjamin 
and Hackstaff's English translation. Pg. 113. 
21. See part one of Nussbaum's paradigm on page seven. 
22. Saint Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will. Augustine com-
ments on sin. He writes, "peccata omnia hoc uno genere contineri, cum 
quisque avertitur a divinis vereque manentibus et ad mutabilia atque incerta 
convertitur. Quae quamquam in ordine suo recte locata sint et suam 
quandam pulchritudinem peragant, perversi tamen animi est et inordinati 
eis sequendis subici quibus ad nutum suum ducendis potius divino ordine 
ac iure praelatus est." Pg. 35. "All sins are included under this one class: 
when someone is turned away from the divine things that are truly ever-
lasting, towards things that change and are uncertain. These things have 
been rightly placed in their own order and complete the universe through 
their own peculiar beauty; but nevertheless, it is characteristic of the per-
verse and disordered spirit to be a slave to the pursuit of the things which 
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divine order and law have prescribed should follow its bidding." The 
translation follows that of Benjamin and Hackstaff. Ppg. 33-34. 
23. See part one of Nussbaum's paradigm on page six. 
24. See part two of Nussbaum's paradigm on page seven. 
25. Saint Augustine. Sermon 150: On the Words of the Acts of the 
Apostles 17:18-34. trans, by Edmund Hill, New York: New City Press, 
1992. Pg. 31. The blessed life is the happy life. For Augustine, philoso-
phers seek to know and live out the blessed life, as do Christians. 
26. Saint Augustine. De Beata Vita; volume 32 of Migne's 
Patrologia Latina. Pg. 72. "Ergo nullo modo dubitamus, si quis beatus 
esse statuit, id eum sibi comparare debere quod semper manet, nec ulla 
saeviente fortuna eripi potest. Deum igitur, inquam, qui habet, beatus 
est." I have followed Mary T. Clark's translation in Augustine of Hippo -
Selected Writings: On the Happy Life, New York: Paulist Press, 1984. 
Pg. 176. This exploration of the idea of happiness occurs in a dialogue 
between Augustine, his mother Monica, his brother Navigus, two cous-
ins and a friend Alypius. Interestingly enough to me, it appears that Monica 
is often times portrayed as the person with the greatest insight to lend to 
the subject of happiness. In fact, the very method by which it is achieved 
is articulated by her. 
27. Saint Augustine. De Beata Vita; volume 32 of Migne's 
Patrologia Latina. Ppg. 118-120. "Illud, jam, inquam, sequitur, ut 
videamus quis non egeat; is enim erit sapiens et beatus. Egestas autem 
stultitia est, egestatisque nomen: hoc autem verbum sterilitatem quamdam 
et inopiam solet significare." I have followed Mary Clark's translation in 
Augustine of Hippo-Selected Writings: On the Happy Life. Ppg. 189-
193. Augustine, later makes clearer this idea of "measure" or "wisdom." 
He says, "Modus, inquam, tile ubique servandus est, ubique amandus, si 
vobis cordi est ad Deum reditus noster." (Pg. 134) As is obvious from 
this passage, returning to God, then, requires a measured or rightly pro-
portioned satisfaction of desires. 
28. Wisdom is proper "modus", while modus had various meanings 
used in the early medieval period. To the early medieval mind, modus 
meant measure, size, amount, limit, fashion, way, and manner. In this 
dialogue, Augustine understands wisdom in the sense of measure, limit 
and amount. Wisdom is that modus (measure, limit) which is full, that 
modus (measure, limit, amount) between excess and deficiency. But wis-
dom as modus can as easily be described, in Augustine's ethic, as right 
"ordo". To the early medievals, ordo expressed the ideas of rank, order, 
and arrangement. Hence, Augustine's conception of wisdom as modus 
might likewise be understood as ordo in two senses. First, wisdom as 
ordo, includes an ordering of one's desires towards the mean between 
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the extremes, but, secondly, wisdom as ordo can likewise be interpreted 
as limiting the desires within an arranged hierarchy. The Augustinian 
conception of wisdom is not most fully understood without this sense of 
ordo because the hierarchy contained in the modus of desire includes 
limiting, sizing, and measuring the loves, not only according to the mean 
between the extremes, but also, additionally, according to the better and 
the worse, the eternal abiding versus the temporal and transitory, accord-
ing to the ordo of the world. Hence, wisdom and loving wisely necessi-
tates placing the loves in their proper order: the abiding God is to be 
loved first, while all else, the transitory and temporal, is to be loved for 
the sake of the abiding God. And if the ordo of love is followed, then a 
desire will never be satisfied in either extreme, inasmuch as extreme de-
sires are testimony to a love which falls away from the abiding God and 
are, instead, wrongly oriented. In this way, wisdom's modus of love, 
simultaneously consists of an ordo of love. 
29. Saint Augustine. De Beata Vita; volume 32 of Migne's 
Patrologia Latina. Ppg. 130-132. "Ilia est igitur plena satietas animorum, 
haec est beata vita, pie perfecteque cognoscere a quo inducaris in veritatem, 
qua veritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo." I have fol-
lowed Mary Clark's translation in Augustine of Hippo-Selected Writ-
ings'. On the Happy Life. Pg. 193. 
30. Roads, I believe, can be considered metaphorically as general 
directions followed over time. It requires some quantity of time traveled 
in order to reach the destination which the general direction (the road) 
aims at. Augustine's idea of happiness, therefore, includes a similar no-
tion. Happiness must include the right direction, but also the right direc-
tion traveled over time. Wisdom includes taking the right road, and the 
right road includes a process of development, over time, in wisdom of 
mind and heart. 
31. Saint Augustine. De Libero Arbitrio; Corpus Scriptorum 
Ecclesiasticorum Latinorumy volume LXXIV. Ppg. 61-62. "In quantum 
igitur omnes homines adpetunt vitam beatam, non errant; in quantum 
autem quisque non earn tenet vitae viam quae ducit ad beatitudinem, cum 
se fateatur et profiteatur nolle nisi ad beatitudinem pervenire, in tantum 
errat. Error est enim cum sequitur aliquid quod non ad id ducit quo 
volumus pervenire. Et quanto magis longe est a veritate, in qua cernitur 
et tenetur summum bonum. Summo autem bono adsecuto et adepto beatus 
quisque fit, quod omnes sine controversia volumus. Ut ergo constat nos 
beatos esse velle, ita nos constat esse velle sapientes, quia nemo sine 
saoientia beatus est. Nemo enim beatus est nisi summo bono, quod in ea 
veritate quam sapientiam vocamus cemitur et tenetur." I have followed 
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the translation of Anna Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1964. Pg. 58. 
32. Saint Augustine. De Beata Vita; volume 32 of Migne's 
Patrologia Latina Pg. 132. 
33. Saint Augustine. The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love. 
Edited by Henry Paolucci and translated by J.F. Shaw, Washington D.C.: 
Gateway, 1991. Pg. 129. Augustine, in this section of the Enchiridion, 
speaks of the future reward of heavenly bliss for those good persons along 
with the future punishment of the wicked. The good of the soul resides in 
attaining this eternal bliss and avoiding the eternal punishment, but my 
discussion of happiness has pointed out that there is also a level of happi-
ness which can be achieved in the worldly life. My discussion of happi-
ness as the objective of the soul has emphasized this limited, worldly 
view. My emphasis has attempted to make clear that happiness, to the 
greatest extent possible in this life, can be achieved by pursuing wisdom 
by way of faith, hope, and love. 
34. 'Via spiritus' is an expression I'm using to suggest both a turn-
ing and progression of the human spirit. Literally, the expression tranlates 
into English as, "the way of the spirit". 
35. Saint Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. St. Petersburg Manu-
script edited by R.P.H. Green as found in Augustine: De Doctrina 
Christiana edited and translated by R.P.H. Green. Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1995. Ppg. 62-64. "Deinde mitescere opus est pietate 
neque contradicere divinae scripturae sive intellectae, si aliqua vitia nostra 
percutit, sive non intellectae, quasi nos melius sapere meliusque praecipere 
possimus, sed cogitare potius et credere id esse melius et verius quod ibi 
scriptum est, etiam si lateat, quam id quod nos per nos ipsos sapere pos-
sumus." I have followed the English translation of Edmund Hill. Pg. 
132. 
36. Saint Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. St. Petersburg Manu-
script edited by R.P.H. Green. Pg. 64. "Nam ista scientia bonae spei 
hominem non se iactantem sed lamentantem facit; quo affectu impetrat 
sedulis precibus consolationem divini adiutorii, ne desperatione frangatur." 
I have followed the english translation of Edmund Hill. Pg. 133. Notice 
the explicit reference made to divine help (grace). This aid is not only 
necessary for this stage in the evolution of the spirit, but, since the via 
spiritus is most certainly able to be characterized as a good, then the whole 
of the spiritual process must, itself, come from God. Hence, the whole 
dynamic evolution of the spirit expressed in this "ladder of spiritual love", 
as a good, is a grace—an unwarranted gift from God. This I think would 
be Augustine's position. 
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37. Saint Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. Translated by 
Edmund Hill. New City Press: New York, 1992. Pg. 133. 
38. Saint Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. St. Petersburg Manu-
script edited by R.P.H. Green. Ppg. 64-66. "Ubi, iam ipsum oculum 
purgat quo videri deus potest, quantum potest ab eis qui huic saeculo 
moriuntur quantum possunt." I have followed the English tranlation of 
Edmund Hill. Pg. 133. 
39. Saint Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. Pg. 133. 
40. Saint Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. Pg. 133. Notice that 
this state of wisdom Augustine defines as a "climbing up", a dynamic 
process forward towards the final stop, "enjoyment in peace and tran-
quillity." 
41. Saint Augustine. The Trinity. Translated by Edmund Hill. New 
City Press: New York, 1991. Pg. 209. Literally translated, 'sapientia 
caritatis' is the wisdom of love. In examining the Trinity, Augustine 
concludes that the blessedness we receive from God constitutes our per-
fection in the image of God. God is love and loving unity of Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit; this is one of the insights of Augustine's journey into the 
inner life of God. Our blessedness, our happiness, resides in our imaging 
this Loving Unity. In short, this love is the sapientia caritus which per-
meates the soul as a gift from God and is an eternal procession flowing 
forth from God's sacred, unique personality. 
42. See part two of Nussbaum's paradigm on page seven. 
43. See part four of Nussbaum's paradigm on page seven. 
44. See part five of Nussbaum's paradigm on page seven. 
45. See part six of Nussbaum's paradigm on page seven. 
46. Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. 
New York: Random House. 1960. Pg. 148. 
47. Saint Augustine. The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love. 
Corpus Christianorum series latina XLVI Pg. 54. Augustine writes in 
the Enchiridion, "Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam naturarum prorsus 
omnium conditor summe bonus est, bonae sunt. Sed quia non sicut earum 
conditor summe atque imcommutabiliter bonae sunt, ideo in eis et minui 
bonum et augeri potest. Sed bono minui malum est, quamuis 
quantumcumque minuatur remaneat aliquid necesse est, si adhuc natura 
est, unde natura sit." "All that exists, therefore, seeing that the Creator of 
them all is supremely good, are themselves good. But because they are 
not, like their Creator, supremely and unchangeably good, their good 
may be diminished and increased. But for good to be diminished is an 
evil, although however much it may be diminished, it is necessary, if the 
being is to continue, that some good remain to constitute the being." 
Translation used is that of J.F. Shaw. Pg. 12. This passage makes evi-
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dent that, for Augustine, created being is always created according to the 
good; if it wasn't good, then it would fall away into nothingness. How-
ever, created being, although it is good, is not unchangeably good. It can 
become better and worse. Created being, therefore, has the potential for 
perfection, but also corruption. Augustine's interpretation of Genesis 
also reaffirms this position concerning the effects of potentially corrupt-
ible, created being. Human beings in their original state were true to their 
good creation, but simultaneously, human beings were also liable to cor-
ruption, a liability which they eventually did freely choose. 
48. Saint Augustine. Of True Religion, trans, by J.H.S. Burleigh. 
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966. Pg. 34. In this text, August-
ine outlines the event of the fall along with its consequences. He ex-
plains that the medium by which the sin occurred, free will, was not it-
self, intrinsically evil. Instead, the free act of disobedience, the free deci-
sion to turn away from God, was, itself, that which was intrinsically evil. 
And from this disobedient act flowed its deserving penalty—pain, suf-
fering, and ignorance. 
49. Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. 
Pg. 156. Gilson sums up this position when he writes, "now since the 
fall, mankind is simply a sinful throng, liable to the supreme justice for 
the penalty it must pay. Whether God remits the penalty by justifying the 
culpable or exacts it by abandoning him, no injustice is done. As for 
deciding who is to pay his penalty and who is to be let off, we are debtors 
and it is not our place to make that decision. God does not compel some 
men to sin because He justifies others from sin, and He only justifies 
some men in virtue of an inscrutable justice, whose motives escape our 
judgment." 
50. Saint Augustine. The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love. 
Pg. 66. Augustine comments on this human dependence upon grace. He 
says, "Item ne quisquam, etsi non de operibus, de ipso glorietur libero 
uoluntatis arbitrio , tanquam ab ipso incipiat meritum cui tanquam debi-
tum reddatur praemium bene operandi ipsa libertas, audiat eundem gratiae 
praeconem dicentem: Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari 
pro bona voluntate." "And further, should anyone be inclined to boast, 
not indeed of his works but of the freedom of his will, as if the first merit 
belonged to him, this very liberty of good action being given to him as a 
reward he had earned, let him listen to this same preacher of grace, when 
he says: For it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of his 
own good pleasure." Translation by G. F. Shaw. Pg. 39. So, for Augus-
tine, it is God, "which worketh in you", which supplies the person with 
the ability to do good, and it is through doing this good, it is through 
loving God and being virtuous in act, that humans find happiness. 
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51. Saint Augustine. The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love. 
Pg. 38. 
52. See part three in Nussbaum's paradigm on page seven. In addi-
tion, in order to substantiate my claims regarding grace and it's therapeu-
tic nature, see Thomas Holtzen's article, 'The Therapeutic Nature of Grace 
in St. Augustine's De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio\ found in—Augustinian 
Studies: Volume 31, number1,2000 Ppg. 93-115. In his article, Holtzen 
argues that Augustine is in line with St. Paul in respect to his views on 
grace and its role in the authentically good and happy life. 'Only grace 
provides the therapy that heals the will from the disease of sin and em-
powers it to act out of love.' (Pg. 103) Grace is that method by which 
eudaemonia is achieved. This is what I am arguing. Without grace, there 
would be no human happiness because a grace-informed act is behind 
both the human being along with its coterminous good, but also, since 
the fall, grace is required to strengthen our crippled selves and restore us 
to our original condition of loving well. However, this must also be said 
about grace: for Augustine, grace additionally strengthens our intellects 
and allows us to acquire knowledge of both God and His created order. 
Grace helps us to philosophically examine God's creation and discern 
those life and health giving truths, without which we would continue to 
persist misguidedly, forever sick, poverty stricken, unhealthy and in need. 
In short then, for Augustine, grace helps humans to construct the proper 
arguments which put God's world accurately in focus so that we may 
understand the truth concerning ourselves, our world, our virtue, our good-
ness, and our happiness through love. 
53. Saint Augustine. Confessiones. Based upon Knoll's (Teubner, 
1909) original Latin text. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Pg. 60. "Hoc enim peccabam, quod non in ipso, sed in creaturis eius, me 
atque ita inruebam in dolores, confusiones, errores." I have followed 
Maria Boulding's translation. Pg. 61. And at the end of Book II, this 
theme of pain and disorder is again evident. Augustine comments, "Quis 
experit istam tortuosissimam et inplicatissimam nodositatem? Foeda est; 
nolo in earn intendere, nolo earn videre. Te volo, iustitia et innocentia, 
pulchra et decora honestis luminibus, et insatiabili satietate. Quies est 
apud te valde et vita imperturbabilis. Qui intrat in gaudium domini sui et 
non timebit et habebit se optime in Optimo. Defluxi abs te ego et erravi, 
deus meus, nimis devius ab stabilitate tua in adulescentia et factus sum 
mihi regio egestatis." Pg. 94. "Who can unravel this most snarled, knotty 
tangle? With you is rest and a tranquil life. Whoever enters into you 
enters into the joy of his Lord; there he will fear nothing and find his own 
supreme good in God who is supreme goodness. I slid away from you 
and wandered away, my God; far from your steadfastness I strayed in 
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adolescence, and I became to myself a land of famine." Again, I have 
followed the Maria Boulding translation. Pg. 74. 
54. Saint Augustine. Confessiones. Based upon Knoll's (Teubner, 
1909) original Latin text. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Pg. 288. "Non enim verum gaudium habebat: sed et ego illis ambitionibus 
multo falsius quaerebam. Et certe ille laetabatur, ego anxuis eram, securus 
ille, ego trpidus." I have followed Maria Boulding's translation. Pg. 
143. 
55. Saint Augustine. Confessiones Pg. 462. "...et tu, domine, 
usquequo? Usqueqo, domine, irasceris in finem? Ne memor fueris 
iniquitatum nostrarum antiquarum. Sentiebam enim eis me teneri. 
lactabam voces miserabiles." I have followed the Maria Boulding trans-
lation. Pg. 206. 
56. Saint Augustine. Confessiones. Based upon Knoll's (Teubner, 
1909) original Latin text. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Pg. 464. "Dicebam haec, et flebam, amarissima contritione cordis mei. 
Et esse audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu dicentis, et crebro 
repetentis, quasi pueri an puellae, nescio: 'tolle lege, tolle lege.'" I have 
followed the Maria Boulding translation. Pg. 206. 
57. Saint Paul. Romans 14:1. 
58. Saint Augustine. Confessiones. Based upon Knoll's (Teubner, 
1909) original Latin text. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Stans in ea regula fidei. Pg. 466. I have followed the Maria Boulding 
translation. Pg. 208. He makes reference to the introduction of faith into 
his life only after he has first recognized his own spiritual death (mortal-
ity), and his fear of God before the final judgement. The pattern of via 
spiritus is being followed. 
59. This final virtue of charity is soon made explicit after he de-
scribes his infusion in faith and hope. 
60. Saint Augustine. Confessiones. Based upon Knoll's (Teubner, 
1909) original Latin text. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Pg. 48. "...erigentes nos ardentiore affectu in id ipsum, perambulavimus 
gradatim cuncta corporalia, et ipsum caelum, unde sol et luna et stellae 
lucent super terram. Et adhuc ascendebamus, interius cogitando et 
loquendo et mirando opera tua, et venimus in mentes nostras et 
transcendimus eas, ut attingerein mentes nostras et transcendimus eas, ut 
attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis, unde pascis Israel in 
aeternum veritate pabulo..." I have followed the Maria Boulding transla-
tion. Pg. 277. 
61. Saint Augustine. Confessiones. Based upon Knoll's (Teubner, 
1909) original Latin text. Pg. 4. "...iam liber erat animus meus a curis 
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mordacibus ambiendi et adquirendi et volutandi atque scalpendi scabiem 
libidinum." In translation, I have followed Maria Boulding's interpreta-
tion of The Confessions. Pg. 210. 
